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Access to information, an important input for making agri-
cultural decisions in production, marketing, and ﬁnance, has
historically been very costly in Africa South of the Sahara.
Farmers who want to sell their products have to search for
the right price, the right buyer, the right standards and grades
of the product. All these searches are costly. Farmers need to
do frequent travel, repeated loading and unloading to show-
case their produce to buyers and brokers. Typical farmers in
Ethiopia sell produce to traders either in their village or in dis-
tant markets which entails substantial transportation and
labor costs. The village markets are characterized by asymmet-
ric information in which traders are more informed than farm-
ers about the prices in the central or regional markets (Tadesse
& Shively, 2013) that makes information searching very costly.
Besides the searching cost for price information from the cen-
tral market, farmers have to incur substantial searching cost to
compare prices of diﬀerent buyers in local markets. Prices also
vary within days and weeks which forces farmers to search for
information every time they want to sell.
Excessive market searching cost causes smallholders to pro-
duce very limited range of goods and services. In the extreme
case, it leads to households to produce only for home con-
sumption. It also constrains them to apply low levels of exter-
nal input and become less responsive to market changes
(Holden, Shiferaw, & Pender, 2001; Sadoulet & Janvry,
1995). Hence, farmers do not realize the gains from trade
and are unable maximize annual farm income through special-
ization according to long-term comparative advantages.
Expansion of mobile phones’ coverage is considered one of
the remedies for such an information problem. The percentage
of the world’s population with mobile phone coverage rose
from around 12% in 1999 to around 76% in 2009. Almost
three-fourths of the world’s mobile phones in 2010 were in
developing countries (Donovan, 2011). In many developing
countries, more people have access to mobile phones than to
older technologies like telephone landlines, newspapers, and
radio (Aker, 2011), though signiﬁcant spatial disparity is
observed (Buys, Dasgupta, Thomas, & Wheeler, 2009).
Improved regulatory environments, technological innova-
tions, and payment options attractive to poor people such as
pre-pay plans have all enabled the rapid uptake of mobile
phones (Donovan, 2011; Haward & Mazaheri, 2009). As a296result, mobile phone coverage is widely expanding in Africa
(Aker & Mbiti, 2010). For example, Ethiopia, one of the low-
est ICT penetrated countries in Africa, had more than 25 mil-
lion mobile subscribers in 2013 (TradingEconomics, 2014).
Although many of the subscribers are in urban centers and
small towns, the penetration to rural areas is also remarkable
and growing very fast over time (Figure 1). According to
Minten, Stifel, and Tamru (2012), in 2005 almost all rural agri-
cultural wholesale markets had access to mobile phones. With
the expansion of rural electriﬁcation, many farmers have got
access to mobile telephone services in recent periods although
the network coverage is still very poor.
Many studies, with few exceptions, have conﬁrmed that
mobile phones are indeed improving farmers’ production
practices and adoption of new practices. Lio and Liu (2006)
found that the adoption of new ICTs increases overall agricul-
tural productivity, perhaps because ICT infrastructure facili-
tates the adoption of modern agricultural inputs. Mittal,
Gandhi, and Tripathi (2010) interviewed Indian farmers and
ﬁsherman who stated that information delivered via mobile
phone allowed them to increase yields. However, an experi-
ment on the eﬀect of the Reuters Market Light (RML) infor-
mation service in India failed to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of the
information service on crop varieties grown or on production
practices (Fafchamps & Minten, 2012).
Mobile phone coverage has also improved market eﬃciency
and reduced consumer prices for certain commodities.
According to Jensen (2007) mobile phone coverage improved
market functioning in Kerala, India. Aker and Fafchamps
(2013) assessed the impact of mobile phones on agricultural
price dispersions in Niger. The study found that while mobile
phone coverage reduced the spatial dispersion of producer
prices for semi perishable commodities like cowpeas; it hadand stands of the institutions. Final revision accepted: December 14, 2014.
Source:  TradingEconomics (2014)
Figure 1. Mobile cellular subscribers in Ethiopia both rural and urban.
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sorghum. The study further found that farmers owning mobile
phones obtained more price information but did not receive
higher prices. The explanation given was non-participation
of farmers in spatial arbitrage. In Ethiopia, access to mobile
phones has improved traders and brokers’ business communi-
cation for negotiating prices and settling payments (Minten
et al., 2012).
However, studies assessing the impact of cell phone on pro-
ducers’ marketing decisions are few. The existing studies that
assessed the link between ICT and farmer’s market participa-
tion have found that access to mobile phone did not signiﬁ-
cantly improve farmers’ market participation and spatial
arbitrage (Alene et al., 2008; Fafchamps & Minten, 2012;
Muto & Yamano, 2009). The reason for such insigniﬁcant
impact is not yet well explained. For mobile phones to inﬂu-
ence farmers’ decision and generate economic beneﬁts, farm-
ers’ marketing decision should ﬁrst be guided by market
information. Smallholders may sell when they are in need of
cash or when they have surplus output beyond their home
consumption irrespective of what is going on in the market.
In this case, having a mobile phone may not necessarily matter
for farmers’ marketing decisions. Second, farmers must use
mobile phones for information searching. This is contingent
upon the presence of an information source that can deliver
reliable, trusted, and understandable information to address
speciﬁc needs and create awareness on diﬀerent uses of mobile
phones including call-in and SMS-services. Third, the cost of
using mobile phones should be within the capacity of small-
holders who have limited access to electricity and air-time
credits.
The objective of this paper is to examine the eﬀect of mobile
phones’ expansion in rural Ethiopia on farmers’ marketing
decisions and prices they receive. It is aimed at providing
farm-level evidence to translate technological opportunities
into economic beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, the paper responds to
the following research questions: (1) Do farmers with mobile
phones make diﬀerent marketing decisions (place of selling
(spatial arbitrage), frequency of selling and quantity of selling)
than those who do not have access to mobile phones? (2) Do
farmers with mobile phone access receive higher prices than
those who have no access to mobile phones? (3) Do small-
holder farmers really search information before making mar-
keting decisions? (4) Do farmers use mobile phone for
searching information? By addressing these questions, thepaper contributes to the growing literature on the impact of
mobile phones on smallholders’ marketing decision and the
price they receive. It also presents new insights into why
mobile phone impact is weak in farm households’ marketing
decisions in Africa.
These insights are derived from a series of econometric mod-
els estimated using household survey data collected from cen-
tral and southern Ethiopia. The ﬁrst model estimated the eﬀect
of mobile phone access on the probability of selling to diﬀerent
market places including village market, district market, and
central market. The second model estimated the impact of
mobile phone access on frequency and quantity of output sold
and price received by farmers. We also studied whether farm-
ers really use mobile phones for information searching or not.
We found that the impact of mobile phone access on farmers’
marketing decision (market arbitrage) and the price they
receive is very weak, which is similar to the ﬁndings of previ-
ous studies in other countries (Aker & Fafchamps, 2013;
Fafchamps & Minten, 2012). However, the explanation is less
likely to relate to non-participation of farmers in spatial or
temporal arbitrage at least in the Ethiopian context. Even
though many farmers participate in information searching
(and market arbitrage), the number of farmers who use mobile
phones for information searching is very small. The reason for
such low use of mobile phones for information searching
seems to be lack of relevant information that can be accessed
through mobile phones. The results are further discussed to
shed light on the need for well-organized and trusted institu-
tions that can deliver information to farmers through ICT.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the conceptual framework, which lays the theoretical founda-
tion of the paper. This section is followed by a brief explana-
tion of the data used to test the hypotheses presented in the
conceptual framework. The third section presents the empiri-
cal models used to test the research questions stated above.
Then, the fourth section presents the results and discusses
the main ﬁndings of the paper. The last section highlights
the major ﬁndings and key policy and research recommenda-
tions.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
To ascertain the importance of mobile phones for small-
holder farmers, we must ﬁrst understand how famers make
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decisions. The literature on farm households’ marketing deci-
sion behavior is very diverse and usually relates to production,
marketing, or trade analysis. In a neoclassical economic theory
where markets are assumed to be perfect and competitive,
marketing decisions are not separable from production deci-
sions because in these markets prices are competitive and diﬀer
across places, times, and forms only to the extent of the com-
petitive cost that requires the product to move from one place
to other, or across time, or to convert from one form to
another. However, in many cases markets are not perfect or
competitive. In this case, prices become endogenous
(deJanvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991; Singh, Squire, &
Strauss, 1986). Farm households have to make a calculated
decision on where to sell, when to sell, how much to sell,
and to whom to sell in order to receive the highest price pos-
sible to maximize their revenue.
According to the new farm household economics, the net
price farmers receive from the market depends on the extent
of market imperfection which is measured in terms of transac-
tion costs. What determines transaction costs is a subject thor-
oughly studied by many authors. Summarizing the major
studies indicates that transaction costs depend on the nature
of transaction (Williamson, 1979) and the extent of informa-
tion asymmetry and searching (Fafchamps, 2004; Stiglitz,
1986). Transaction costs depend on asset speciﬁcity, frequency
of transaction, and uncertainty of transaction, which mainly
stems from information uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). Infor-
mation searching is costly in Africa (Fafchamps, 2004). It
surges the level of transaction costs, thereby reduces the net
price farmers receive. In general, information searching cost
is an important component of transaction costs in an economy
where markets are characterized by imperfections, implying
that reducing information searching cost is an important
development goal to improve farm households’ marketing
and commercialization.
Many institutional and technological innovations have been
evolved to reduce transaction cost in general information
searching in particular. Mobile phone is one of the technolog-
ical innovations that have been praised for reducing informa-
tion costs not only in industrial sectors but also in agriculture
and social sectors (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). In rural communities,
mobile phones help in facilitating social and business commu-
nications. With the advent of mobile phones, many rural com-
munities can easily communicate on social aﬀairs such as
funeral services, wedding ceremonies, and religious matters.
Similarly, access to mobile phones eases the process of farm-
ers’ market information searching at a lower cost than other
mechanisms (Aker, 2011; Jensen, 2010). With the help of
mobile phones, farmers can decide on where, to whom, and
when to sell their products and purchase inputs more easily
than without mobile phones. Therefore, access to mobile
phones can build farmers’ conﬁdence (reduce information
uncertainty) on transactions, reduce marketing costs, and help
them to receive higher prices.
In summary, having mobile phones reduces information
searching cost that prompts farmers to relax their choices over
diﬀerent alternatives of marketing. By properly assessing such
alternatives, farmers can receive higher prices. However, such
high price or market arbitrage will surely be attributed to
mobile phone access if farmers do search information while
packing for sale and are actually using the mobile phones for
searching. This logical framework allows us to distinguish
three sets of empirically testable variables. The ﬁrst group
includes intermediate (outcome) variables representing mar-
keting decisions such as: (1) farmers’ choice of market places;(2) frequency of selling and (3) quantity sold. The second group
is the impact variables represented by prices received by farm-
ers for diﬀerent commodities. The third is a conditioning vari-
able that represents the use of mobile phones for information
searching. Estimating all these variables along the impact path-
way helps to ascertain the impact of mobile phones on market-
ing decisions due to easing information searching.3. DATA
The data used in this paper are extracted from a household
survey conducted in 2012 in central Ethiopia where farmers
are considered as surplus producers. The survey was con-
ducted as a baseline study for a project that aimed at empow-
ering smallholder farmers through organizing cooperatives
and introducing ICTs for agricultural marketing. A multi-
stage sampling technique was used to select sample house-
holds. In the ﬁrst stage, we selected six districts from the four
administrative zones of the Oromia regional state, which is the
largest region in Ethiopia. The districts (locally called Wore-
das) were randomly selected from the list of districts where
the project operates. The sample districts were Sinana, Shas-
hemene, Arsi Negele, Sedden Soddo, Becho, and Jeldu. These
districts have diﬀerent agro-ecologies and farming systems.
While Sinana is located in the eastern highlands of Ethiopia
where barley and wheat are the two most important cropping
systems, Sedden Soddo, Becho, and Jeldu districts are located
in the central highlands of Ethiopia where teﬀ is a dominant
cropping system. The other two districts –Arsi Negele and
Shashemene are located in the southern highlands of the coun-
try where farmers mainly grow maize and wheat.
In the second stage, we selected sample villages, locally
known as Kebeles, from each district. To select sample villages,
we grouped villages within a district based on the presence of a
cooperative in the village. Sample villages were randomly
selected from each group. The number of villages selected
from each district depended on the number of villages which
have cooperatives. In total, 24 (16 with cooperatives and 8
without cooperatives) villages were selected. The number of
sample villages with cooperative is higher than the number
of sample villages without cooperatives because of larger num-
ber of villages with cooperatives than villages without cooper-
atives.
Sampling of households was done diﬀerently in villages with
and without cooperatives. In a village where there is a cooper-
ative, we chose both members and nonmembers of the pro-
ducer cooperatives. In a village where there is no
cooperative, all the samples are non-members. Samples are
randomly drawn from the list of cooperative members and
from the list of residents of a village for non-members. We
chose a larger number of samples from a village with a coop-
erative than from a village without a cooperative. A total of
1023 households were selected for interviews. However, the
sample size used to estimate each model is diﬀerent due to
missing values and inappropriateness of some variables for
certain farmers.
Sample households were interviewed by experienced and
well-trained enumerators who were hired for this purpose
using a structured and pretested questionnaire. The question-
naire used to collect the data was very rich and contained
many variables related to market access, information search-
ing, marketing practices, and total value sold for diﬀerent
crops. The use of mobile phone for information searching
was speciﬁcally asked in order to understand the role of ICTs
for accessing markets. Other demographic and socioeconomic
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sample households used for this study are presented in
Table 12.4. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES
Informed by the conceptual framework outlined above, our
empirical estimation follows step-wise procedures to test sev-
eral hypotheses along the change pathway. We ﬁrst estimated
the eﬀect of mobile phone access on outcome variables repre-
senting market arbitrage and frequency and size of transaction
such as farmers’ choice of marketplaces, frequency of selling,
and quantity sold. Then, we estimated the impact of mobile
phone ownership and access on prices received. Finally, we
estimated determinants of mobile phone use for information
searching. This is helpful to understand the reason behind
the presence or absence of empirical link between mobile
phone access and farm gate prices. The dependent variables
take diﬀerent values, calling for diﬀerent types of econometric
models to be estimated. Depending on the type of dependent
variables, we used the following four types of estimation meth-
ods:
(1) Bivariate probit for estimating where-to-sell and
whom-to-sell. Both conceptually and empirically, farm-
ers’ choice of selling a commodity either to the village
market or distant market and selling to the cooperative
or private trader are contemporaneously correlated. As
a result we estimated them together to improve the eﬃ-
ciency of the parameters’ estimates.
(2) Ordered probit for estimating the frequency of transac-
tion (selling) in which the dependent variable takes
ordered values as once per year, twice per year, and
more than twice per year
(3) Ordinary Least Square (OLS) for estimating the aver-
age price received and size of transaction (quantity
sold) by farmers.
(4) Binary probit for estimating farmers’ use of mobile
phone for information searching: In this model, the
dependent variable takes a binary value of 1 if the
household uses mobile phones for information search-
ing and 0 if not.
These estimations are made for diﬀerent treatment variables,
set of control variables and agricultural commodities. Two
treatment variables are alternatively used to measure the
impact of mobile phone access on diﬀerent outcome variables.
The ﬁrst one is household-level mobile phone ownership.
However, information is not always a private good. A house-
hold that owns a mobile phone and obtains information
through the mobile phone may share the information with
neighboring households. Therefore, it may not be possible to
observe diﬀerences between households who own mobile
phones and those who do not in the same village. To overcome
this problem, we estimated a second variable which is the vil-
lage-level mobile phone penetration rate that indicates the
density of mobile phone coverage in the village computed as
the percentage of households who own mobile phones in the
village. The major assumption is that the average village-level
decision is aﬀected by access to information at village level
through network eﬀect. According to the network economics,
which is widely applied in business (Nagurney, 1999) and
recently in development (Mckenzie & Rapoport, 2007), a net-
work eﬀect is present if the use of a good or service by some-
one has eﬀect on the value of that product to other people. The
eﬀect of village-level mobile density is meant to capture such
network eﬀect in rural areas of Ethiopia.Control variables (covariates) are included in all the models
to control for observable heterogeneity within the samples.
Many of the variables listed in Table 12 are taken as controls,
except the endogenous variables for example total crop sale.
Some of the control variables are included in all of the models.
These are household head characteristics such as sex, age, and
years of schooling to control for heterogeneity in households’
skill and access to information. Market access variables such
as physical distance from the nearest market, transportation
means, and ownership of back animals are included to control
for diﬀerences in households’ access to markets. Gender disag-
gregated labor endowment is also included to control for dif-
ferences in the shadow wage which is an important component
of information searching cost. The size of total cultivated land
is included to control for the total quantity of crop production
that may aﬀect households’ ability to market diﬀerently. Other
explanatory variables are included depending on the nature of
the dependent variables. For example, in a model that esti-
mates farmers’ decision to sell to a cooperative, we included
variables that distinguish households as member and non-
members of farmers’ organizations and the physical distance
of the households to cooperative center. The probability of
generating non-farm income is included in models that esti-
mate quantity sold, frequency of selling, and price received.
Access to electricity is included while estimating the use of
mobile phones for information searching. The lists of control
variables included in each model are noted under each table
presenting the results.
Many of the models are independently estimated for each
crop type. Estimating them jointly or pooling them together
would have increased eﬃciency of estimates. However, two
major reasons hinder us from doing so. First, the crops are
not grown by similar farmers. Farmers who produce barley
are diﬀerent from farmers who produce teﬀ. Hence, we do
not have the same observation for the crops. Second, the mar-
ket structure of the crops is completely diﬀerent. For example,
teﬀ market is diﬀerent from say, maize and vegetable markets
in terms of number of traders involved, price certainty, and
seasonality. These diﬀerences will inﬂate heterogeneity and
undermine the consistency of the estimates. Therefore, we esti-
mated each of the above models for each commodity sepa-
rately.
(a) Endogeneity tests
Since mobile phone ownership by itself is an outcome vari-
able that may depend on households’ socio-economic condi-
tions, it could be correlated with the error term of the
dependent variables. To check the robustness of the estimates,
we tested for endogeneity of mobile phone ownership using
Control Function (CF) approach. CF is selected for two rea-
sons: (1) it is eﬃcient even for weak instruments, (2) its special
application proposed by Wooldridge (2007), is eﬃcient for
binary outcome endogenous variables which other IV (Instru-
mental Variable) methods (2SLS, GMM, or ivprobit) do not
estimate eﬃciently. We followed Wooldridge (2007) two-stage
endogeneity test. First, we run a probit function that estimated
owning a mobile phone as a function of many exogenous
variables. These variables are of two types. The ﬁrst group
of variables are control variables that are included in the
second-stage estimation. The second group of variables are
instruments that satisfy the orthogonality condition of IVs.
Finding an appropriate instrument especially in cross-sectional
data is always a challenge. We chose four instrumental
variables which we think strongly aﬀect mobile phone
ownership but not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the outcome variables.
Table 2. Determinants of owning a mobile phone in rural areas of Ethiopia
Determinants Marginal eﬀects Std. Err.
Age of the household head 0.004*** 0.002
Market distance in KM 0.006** 0.003
Distance from the village center in km 0.014 0.010
Distance from all-weather road in km 0.001** 0.000
Availability of cooperatives in the village 0.044 0.039
Per capita cultivated land holding 0.002 0.004
Participation in non-farm activities 0.025 0.036
Livestock holding (cattle) 0.032*** 0.005
Basic education of the household head 0.194*** 0.041
Basic education of household head spouse 0.127*** 0.038
Access to electric power 0.185*** 0.049
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Note: N = 758.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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basic education or not, (b) whether the household has access
to electricity or not and, c) cattle ownership as a proxy to
wealth. Basic numeric, reading, and writing literacy is an
important precondition for a household to own and use
mobile phone. Similarly, electric power is very essential to
charge mobile phones regularly. Access to electric power is
both village and household dependent. In rural Ethiopia, some
villages have access to electric power from the national hydro-
power system. However, many do not have this access but they
can access solar power. Solar power access is not uniform, some
households own solar power equipment and others do not.
From the ﬁrst-stage estimation we predicted the generalized
residual, which is the inverse Mills ratio of the predicted value
of owning a mobile phone. Then, the generalized residual is
included in the second-stage estimation that estimated the out-
come variables (price, place of sale, and quantity sold) against
observed mobile ownership and other control variables other
than the instruments. Endogeneity is detected if the general-
ized residual is statistically signiﬁcant in the second stage
regressions. The result is shown in Table 13. Of the 28 cases
over diﬀerent types of dependent variables and commodities,
the generalized residual is only statistically signiﬁcant for 8
cases. Endogeneity is detected mainly in a model estimating
size of transaction or quantity sold at time of sale. It is also
detected for selling wheat and barley to cooperatives. When-
ever we detected an endogeneity problem, we used the results
of the control function estimation. However, for models where
endogeneity is not detected we used non-IV estimations. In the
absence of endogeneity, performing IV estimation inﬂates the
asymptotic variance of the estimators (Wooldridge, 2003).5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Mobile phone coverage and ownership in the study areas
The use of mobile phones is rapidly expanding in rural Ethi-
opia. All the study areas have access to mobile phone cover-
age. We did not ﬁnd a village without a mobile phone. Close
to half of the households own at least one mobile phone
(Table 1). Some households own as many as 6 mobile phones.
However, the extent of network coverage and the rates of
mobile phone penetration are diﬀerent across locations. In
some districts, three-quarters of the total households own a
mobile phone. In others, only one-quarter of the households
own a mobile phone. Village-level penetration rate ranges
from 23% to 88%.
To further shed light on the distribution of mobile phones
across households, we estimated determinants of mobile
phone ownership using a probit function. The results are
shown in Table 2. All the variables included show the expectedTable 1. Mobile phone coverage in rural areas of Ethiopia
Districts (Woredas) Percent of households owning
Sinana 72
Jeldu 45
Sedden Soddo 38
Dewo 26
Arsi Negele 52
Shashemene 42
Total 46
Authors’ estimation form survey data.sign. Age and education are found as signiﬁcant variables for
owning a mobile phone. As expected, young and educated
household heads have higher probability of owing mobile
phone than old and uneducated household heads. Wealth as
indicated by livestock size is also signiﬁcant. Better-oﬀ farmers
are more likely to aﬀord a mobile phone. Access to electric
power has signiﬁcant eﬀects because many of the mobile
phones owned by farmers have short-lived batteries and fre-
quent charging is necessary. More interestingly, market access
is found to be an important determinant. Famers who are far
from the local market and all-weather roads have higher prob-
ability of owning mobile phones than farmers who are close to
these centers.
(b) Market arbitrage
Market arbitrage is broadly deﬁned as a practice of taking
advantage of price diﬀerences across market places, times,
and buyers/sellers of diﬀerent kinds. In this paper, it includes
spatial arbitrage as well as choice of buyers by smallholder
producers. In areas where markets are imperfect, prices vary
not only across markets but also across traders (buyers).
Hence, farmers have to search and choose the higher price
among the diﬀerent buyers in the markets. The buyers could
be cooperatives or private traders or consumers. In the study
areas, farmers have access to many markets including village,
district, and to some extent regional markets. Village markets
are very near markets where village assemblers (similar to
retailers) purchase agricultural produce for wholesaling in pri-
mary and secondary markets. Primary markets are markets
located at the center of the district. They are farther thanTable 3. Percentage of farmers selling their outputs in village, primary and
secondary markets
Commodity Village market Primary market Secondary market
Teﬀ 15.8 65.6 18.7
Wheat 34.8 51.3 13.9
Maize 33.7 61.2 5.1
Barley 39.0 55.3 5.7
Peas 2.4 67.1 30.5
Beans 16.7 35.2 48.2
Vegetables 30.7 41.6 27.7
Eggs 31.3 56.7 11.9
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
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markets are markets whereby regional wholesalers buy grains
for transporting to distant consumer markets. In some places
the distinction of these markets is subtle. However, one can
ﬁnd at least two marketplaces in a given locality that a farmer
has to choose from in deciding where to sell. Table 3 summa-
rizes the number of farmers selling to the diﬀerent markets.
Farmers’ choice of marketplaces varies across commodities.
While low-value (maize, wheat, and barley) and bulky (vegeta-
bles) commodities are sold at nearest markets, high-value com-
modities (teﬀ, peas and beans) are being sold at distant
markets. Animal products are usually sold at nearest markets.
Spatial arbitrage in the study area is done by farmers as well
as traders. The role of traders depends on where the transac-
tion is taking place and the type of commodity. We consider
only the grain market in this paper. Many previous studies
(Gabre-Madhin & Amha, 2005; Minten et al., 2012) indicate
that the role of traders in Ethiopian grain marketing varies
across spatially disaggregated markets. In the village market,
they are assemblers who determine price and other terms of
trade based on negotiation with farmers. They exchange based
on payment on delivery. They do not provide credit. The num-
ber of buyers in the village market is very small but farmers do
have also option to sale to a bigger district market which is not
far from their villages. In this market, the buyers are wholesal-
ers but they do not provide credit for food grains. The number
of buyers is large. Pricing is made through bilateral negotia-
tions, however, the farmer has the option to move to the next
trader if the negotiation fails. This implies that farmers do
really engage in arbitrage between village and district markets
and between buyers in each market.
To test the impact of mobile phone on marketplace choice,
we grouped markets into two: village and distant markets.Table 4. Eﬀect of mobile phone on market arbitrage (marginal valu
Commodities N Marginal eﬀects of mobile phone access on proba
selling to the village market (1)
Household ownership (3) Village-level penetratio
Teﬀ 298 0.06 0.49***
(0.05) (0.17)
Wheat 478 0.05 0.42***
(0.05) (0.13)
Maize 85 0.05 0.28
(0.37) 0.46
Barley 132 0.07 0.92***
(0.08) (0.25)
Pulses(4) 186 0.10* 0.82***
(0.05) (0.16)
Vegetables 96 0.0001 0.74**
(0.10) (0.30)
Animal products 82 0.07 0.77**
(0.11) (0.26)
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Notes: (1) Control variables included are household head characteristics (sex, a
female adults, number of male adults, distance from the nearest market, transp
the village or not. (2) In addition to the variables listed in (1), membership to co
household owns a mobile phone or not, village-level penetration rate measures p
account for village-level information ﬂow. (4) The number of farmers selling pu
unable to make any regression. (5) Pulses include peas and beans, (6) numbe
because the commodity is not sold to cooperatives.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.Farmers’ market choice together with buyers (cooperatives
vs. private traders) choice was regressed against household-
and community-speciﬁc variables including access to mobile
phones measured in terms of household- and village-level
ownership. The results are presented in Table 4. An important
hypothesis tested in this section is whether there is a statistical
diﬀerence in spatial market choice between farmers with
mobile phones and farmers without mobile phones. The sign
should depend on the eﬃciency of the markets. If the village
market is eﬃcient (a village market is said to be eﬃcient if
the extra cost of marketing is similar to the extra gain of mov-
ing the product to the next distant market), farmers who have
information about all the markets will tend to sell to the vil-
lage market. If the village market is ineﬃcient, they will tend
to sell to the distant markets. What the mobile phone does
is to reveal the eﬃciency of the market. Thus, the sign of
mobile access is inconsequential. In fact, farmers with mobile
phone access tend to sell more likely to the village for many of
the commodities except for barley (Table 4). However, house-
hold-level mobile phone ownership has no statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on spatial market choice of farmers except for
pulses. This result is in line with previous study in Niger,
which found signiﬁcant eﬀects of mobile phone only on cow
pea price dispersion (Aker & Fafchamps, 2013).
In contrast, village-level mobile phone access has signiﬁcant
and strong impact on marketplace choices for many of the
commodities studied. Those farmers who live in highly pene-
trated villages have higher probability of selling to the village
market compared to farmers in less penetrated villages. This
indicates a strong network eﬀect in which private mobile
phones are generating village public goods or owning mobile
phone has positive externality for the village. Information
sharing, especially market information, among villagees and robust standard errors derived from biprobit estimation)
bility of Marginal eﬀects on the probability of selling to cooperatives
(2)
n rate (3) Household ownership (3) Village-level penetration rate (3)
0.05 0.08
(0.04) (0.16)
0.20** 0.07
(0.10) (0.11)
0.66 0.64*
(0.46) (0.35)
0.08 0.38
(0.07) (0.31)
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
ge, and years of schooling), per capita cultivated land holding, number of
ortation means, number of back animals and availability of cooperative in
operative is included. (3) While households’ ownership measures whether a
ercentage of farmers who own mobile phones in the village. It is meant to
lses, animal products, and vegetables to cooperatives is very few and hence
rs in the parentheses are standard errors, (7) NA implies not applicable
302 WORLD DEVELOPMENTresidents is very common in Ethiopia. This is particularly the
case in areas where village residents are uniform in terms of
socio-cultural factors such as religion and ethnicity. Our sam-
ple areas are uniform with regard to these factors. They are
drawn from the same region. This uniformity has allowed
farmers to share information generated through mobile
phones However, the results have to be interpreted cautiously
in a sense that highly penetrated villages might be those vil-
lages which are located in a well-developed market so that
farmers sell to that market not because of mobile phones
but because of the development of the market and the fact that
a market is close to them.
Table 4 also shows the impact of mobile phone access on
selling to cooperatives or to private trader. Here we tested if
there is any variation in buyer choice due to mobile phone
access. For many commodities the impact is insigniﬁcant. It
is signiﬁcant and negative only for maize and wheat. Farmers
who have access to mobile phones are less likely to sell to the
cooperative. This is in line with our expectation that farmers
sell to cooperatives because they lack adequate information
about open (traders’) markets. If they get enough information
from the open market via mobile phones, there is little incen-
tive for famers to sell to the cooperative market.
(c) Frequency and size of transaction
Table 5 summarizes the average quantity per transaction
and the frequency of selling for the diﬀerent commodities.
The results reveal that farmers who own mobile phones seem
selling higher quantity per transaction than farmers who do
not have mobile phones for most of the commodities studied.
It is also observed that perishable and bulk products such as
animal products and vegetables are sold more frequently than
storable commodities (Table 5).
However, there seems to be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence among
farmers on the frequency of selling the same commodity
requiring extra explanations other than storability and perish-
ability. One such explanation is searching cost which includes
substantial amount of sunk costs that have to be incurred per
sale. Thus, if searching cost is pervasive, farmers prefer to sell
less frequently than the case where searching cost is less impor-
tant. In a situation where searching cost is low, one can sell or
buy products at any time when he/she wants to do so. The
opposite is true if the searching cost is high. If the searching
cost is large and that cost is incurred each time of transaction,
a rational market operator plans to transact less frequently.
However, this conceptual argument is not supported by the
empirical statistical tests (Table 6). Table 6 presents the results
of ordered probit that estimated the probability of sellingTable 5. Frequency and quantity of tr
Commodities N Percentage of farmers who sold
Once per year Twice per year More than
Teﬀ 306 16.3 42.2
Wheat 545 21.8 35.8
Maize 98 23.5 29.6
Barley 135 17.8 40.0
Pulses 81 32.1 25.9
Vegetables 100 22.0 15.0
Eggs 68 1.5 4.4
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Note: Quantity sold per time of sale is derived by dividing the total annual safrequencies against household-level mobile phone ownership
and village penetration rate. Even though many of the com-
modity-speciﬁc models predicted positive eﬀect of mobile
phone ownership on selling frequency, they are not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Similarly, village-level mobile phone penetra-
tion rates have shown a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the
probability of frequent selling only in two commodities
(Wheat and Barley). An increase in mobile density at village
level increases the probability of frequent selling (more than
twice per year) for these commodities. In general, it seems that
the diﬀerence in selling frequency among farmers is not due to
mobile phone access. Mobile phone access has little eﬀect on
frequency of selling.
The traditional way of market information searching is
through face-to-face contact with potential buyers. This
method requires carrying the product by the person searching
for prices. To make the searching process easy and less costly,
farmers prefer to carry small quantities per time of selling.
Such a strategy will no longer be required in the presence of
mobile phones that reduce the cost of information searching
and hence farmers tend to pack larger quantity per time of
sale. We tested this hypothesis by regressing size of transaction
(quantity sold per sale) against mobile phone access at house-
hold and village level separately. The result revealed that
mobile phone has indeed statistically a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on average quantity per transaction for four commodi-
ties (teﬀ, wheat, maize, and vegetables) out of six commodities
(Table 6). In a risky market, farmers prefer to sell piecemeal.
Access to mobile phone reduces information risk and hence
encourages farmers to sell larger quantities per transaction.
Unlike other marketing decisions, the eﬀect of household-level
mobile phone access is wider than village-level mobile phone
access for this decision. This could be due to the fact that
the decision on quantity of transaction is made based on
household-speciﬁc (private) information unlike others like
where or whom to sell, which can be decided by publicly avail-
able information. Generally, the eﬀect of mobile phone access
is relatively strong in quantity of transactions than frequency
of transaction.
(d) Producer prices
Farmers receive diﬀerent prices for the same crop. Table 7
shows the signiﬁcant diﬀerence among farmers’ prices as
implied by large coeﬃcient of variation that ranges from
27% to 67%. This variation could be attributed to access to
price information. We disaggregated the mean prices by
mobile ownership to examine how information through
mobile phone helps in obtaining a better price (Table 7).ansactions by smallholder farmers
Average quantity per transaction in 100 kg
twice a year Who own mobile phone Not own mobile phone
41.5 1.8 1.2
42.4 16.5 10.6
46.9 5.4 3.2
42.2 5.3 10.7
42.0 1.1 2.6
63.0 14.6 4.7
94.1 7.1 1.2
le to the frequency of selling per year.
Table 6. Eﬀect of mobile phone access on frequency and size of transaction
Commodities Marginal eﬀects of mobile phone access on probability of
selling frequently (1, 2)
Elasticity of quantity supply to mobile phone access (2)
Household ownership Village-level penetration rate Household ownership Village-level penetration rate
Teﬀ 0.005 0.011 1.154** 2.177***
(0.06) (0.22) (0.53) (0.80)
Wheat 0.001 0.233* 1.632*** 4.620***
(0.04) (0.14) (0.37) (0.36)
Maize 0.018 0.215 0.491*** 0.604
(0.10) (0.39) (0.19) (0.87)
Barley 0.094 0.678** 1.119 0.980
(0.08) (0.34) (0.72) (0.80)
Pulses 0.113 1.854 0.506 0.884
(0.10) (1.18) (0.40) (1.56)
Vegetables 0.075 0.367 3.291** 0.837
(0.10) (0.37) (1.25) (1.97)
Animal products (0.03) 0.084 NA NA
(0.08) (0.20)
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Note: (1) Frequency of transaction is deﬁned as 1 = if a farmers sells only once a year; 2 if a farmer sells twice a year; 3 if a farmer sells more than twice a
year. It is estimated using ordered probit. The marginal eﬀects reported here are the marginal eﬀects of the highest order, that is, the marginal eﬀects of
owning mobile phone and an increase in village-level penetration rate on frequent selling (more than twice a year). For example, 0.094 under household
ownership for barley is interpreted as owning mobile phone increases the probability of selling more than twice a year by about 0.094. Similarly 0.678
under village-level penetration rate, it is interpreted as an increase in penetration rate by one, increases the probability of selling more than twice per year
by about 0.678. (2) Control variables included are household head characteristics (sex, age, and years of schooling), per capita cultivated land holding,
distance from the nearest market, and distance from village center, transportation means, and households’ participation in non-farm income generation.
(3) Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (4) NA implies not applicable because the commodity is not sold to cooperatives.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 7. Variation in producer prices among farmers
Crops Coeﬃcient
of variation
Mean price in ETB/100 kg
Total Do not own
mobile phone
Own mobile
phone
Diﬀerence
Teﬀ 0.67 1,106 1,078 1,161 82
Wheat 0.27 663 666 661 5
Maize 0.32 460 442 482 40
Barley 0.42 609 621 597 23
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Note: We reported only for the four crops because the other three com-
modities such as vegetables, animal products, and pulses represent group
commodities. They do not have single price life wheat. For example, in
pulses you ﬁnd chickpea and haricot bean, we pooled together because of
their similarity in production and marketing practices but their prices are
diﬀerent. The sample size is very small to estimate for each commodity in
the group.
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of the four crops.
However, this descriptive result is not suﬃcient to attribute
mobile phone ownership to price diﬀerences. An econometric
model is used to estimate the actual eﬀect of mobile phone
ownership on prices of diﬀerent crops. The model is speciﬁed
as
ln P i ¼ a0 þ a1Li þ a2Mi þ a3Qi þ ei
where ln P is the logarithmic transformation of nominal prices
and the right hand variables are the diﬀerent explanatory vari-
ables. Farmers receive diﬀerent prices for many reasons. First,
they are located in diﬀerent places where prices are diﬀerentdue to distance to central markets. This eﬀect is controlled
by L. Second, the time of selling might be diﬀerent. Third,
the place of selling and the type of buyer could be diﬀerent
causing signiﬁcant diﬀerence in prices received. These vari-
ables: time of selling, place of selling, and type of buyer are
endogenous to mobile phone ownership. Farmers with mobile
phones can sell at time where they fetch higher price, to a
buyer who oﬀers higher price and to the market that has a
higher net price through intensive price searching and negoti-
ation. Thus, the eﬀects of these variables (time of selling, place
of selling, type of buyer) are captured through mobile phone
ownership, M. Fourth, the total quantity a farmer supplied
to the market in a year, represented by Q may matter for
the level of price the farmer receive from traders. Finally,
the quality of grain supplied by the diﬀerent farmers could
be diﬀerent. Unfortunately, we did not have quality informa-
tion in our data set and hence unable to include it as an
explanatory variable.
The results indicate that mobile phone ownership has no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of price except for
wheat (Table 8). The elasticity of wheat price is signiﬁcant
and positive. This could be due to the fact that wheat is being
traded by Ethiopian Government as a strategy to stabilize
food price volatility and hence price information for wheat
can easily be accessed through mobile phones. The eﬀect of vil-
lage-level mobile phone access is totally insigniﬁcant. This
result is consistent with the ﬁndings of previous studies
(Aker & Fafchamps, 2013; Fafchamps & Minten, 2012).
This analysis and the previous ones showed that the eﬀect of
mobile phone access on farmers marketing decision and price
received is either nil or very minimal. Three possible reasons
may explain these ﬁndings: (1) farmers may not need informa-
tion at all because they do not do spatial and temporal arbi-
trage. (2) Farmers may not use the mobile phones for
Table 8. The eﬀect of mobile phone ownership on producer prices
Mobile phone access Logarithm of prices (elasticity and std.
Err.)
Teﬀ Wheat Maize Barley
Household ownership 0.012 0.071* 0.155 0.024
(0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.09)
Village penetration rate 0.192 0.069 0.111 0.235
(0.21) (0.20) (0.50) (0.78)
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Note: (1) The numbers in the parenthesis are standard errors. (2) Control
variables included are district dummies and total quantity sold per year.
* p < 0.10.
304 WORLD DEVELOPMENTinformation searching; and (3) the information obtained
through mobile phones is not relevant. We examined the ﬁrst
two of these possibilities. Our data do not allow us to verify
the last hypotheses.
(e) Do farmers need price information for marketing decision?
Previous studies which have more or less similar ﬁndings
attribute the absence of mobile phone’s impact on smallhold-
ers’ decision to farmers’ inability to engage in spatial arbi-
trage. In other words, it seems that farmers’ marketing
decisions are not guided by price information rather by other
structural problems such as immediate need of cash, availabil-
ity of transportation, and others. This prompted us to ask
whether famers need information for making marketing deci-
sions. We speciﬁcally asked farmers whether they search for
price information before packing their outputs for sale. The
result indicated that about 90% of the farmers indeed search
for market information before selling their produce. This
implies that market arbitrage is a common practice among
smallholder farmers. Farmers search prices of diﬀerent local
and central markets and diﬀerent buyers. The major sources
of market information are traders, media, and development
agents (Table 9). Of the farmers who seek market information,
close to 72% search from traders and development agents
which can be communicated with either through mobile
phones or face-to-face interaction. Such information searching
either improves their bargaining power or provides alternative
markets from which they can choose from to obtain higher
prices. The quantity farmers’ supply to the market might be
very small and uneconomical to arbitrage between central
and local markets. However, smallholder farmers access sev-
eral local and regional markets to arbitrage. If they do not
arbitrage, searching information is meaningless.Table 9. Sources of market information
Sources Frequency Percentage
Traders 423 50.5
Radio and TV 222 26.5
Development Agents 181 21.6
Cooperatives 5 0.6
Neighboring Farmers 4 0.5
Others 2 0.2
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.(f) Do farmers’ use mobile phone for information searching
We also asked whether farmers who search price informa-
tion use mobile phones or not. The results indicate that the
use of mobile phone for acquiring business information is
very limited. Only 43% of farmers who own mobile phones
use them to search for market information (Table 10). Sur-
prisingly, some farmers who have no mobile phone obtain
market information through mobile phones. Possible expla-
nation would be the use of neighbors’ mobile phones or
sharing information from neighbors who own mobile
phones. This is consistent with the higher eﬀect of village-
level mobile phone density on diﬀerent marketing decisions
presented earlier.
The use of mobile phones for information searching depends
on demand and supply side factors of accessing information.
The demand for information relates to the quantity of product
the farmers supply to the market, farmer’s awareness about
the importance of information, the ability of getting informa-
tion through other means and access to mobile phones. It also
relates to the technical ability of the farmer in using mobile
phones. The supply side factors relate to the presence of an
information source which provides reliable and accessible
information. All these variables were represented by diﬀerent
proxy variables and a probit model was estimated to investi-
gate the relative importance of the demand and supply side
factors.
The results clearly indicate that farmers who are close to
an institutional center, be it the open market, cooperative,
or the village center, have a higher probability of using
mobile phones for information searching than farmers who
are far from such centers (Table 11). Farmers closer to mar-
kets might have better access to information sources from
which they obtain reliable information about current and
expected prices as they might have better social ties with
traders and institutions in the market than distant farmers,
which has been proved in previous studies (Tadesse &
Shively, 2013). Therefore, availability of an information
source is more important than lack of information for driv-
ing farmers’ decisions to use mobile phones for information
searching. This implies that the demand for information is
less strong than the supply of information in explaining
the use of ICT for agricultural decisions. A mere existence
of mobile phones in the village may not necessarily mean
farmers are using the technology to solve information prob-
lems. Only those who have access to an information source
and know where to search for information are using the
technology to facilitate information access.
As expected, younger households are more likely to use
mobile phones for information searching than older house-Table 10. Percentage of households using mobile phone for market
information searching
Owning mobile phone Percentage % of farmers use
mobile phone for market
information searching
Farmers who own mobile
phones
46 (464) 43 (200)
Farmers who do not own
mobile phone
54 (548) 6 (32)
Total 100 (1012) 23 (232)
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Numbers in the parentheses are number of farmers.
Table 11. Determinants of the probability of using mobile phone for market
information searching (marginal eﬀects and standard errors)
Explanatory variables The whole
sample
Mobile owners
only
Owning mobile 0.4002***
(0.0890)
Market distance 0.0094*** 0.0118**
(0.0029) (0.0053)
Distance from village center 0.0154* 0.0316*
(0.0084) (0.0169)
Distance form all-weather
road
0.0004 0.0025
(0.0002) (0.0023)
Availability of cooperative in
the village (Kebele)
0.0570* 0.0755
(0.0313) (0.0602)
Per capita cultivated land
holding
0.0007* 0.0195
(0.0004) (0.0704)
Age of the household head 0.0009 0.0020
(0.0012) (0.0025)
Years of schooling of the
household head
0.0049 0.0027
(0.0045) (0.0085)
Access to electricity 0.0373 0.0054
(0.0406) (0.0734)
Generalized Residual /IMR
(1)
0.0454 0.0000
(0.0575) (0.1052)
N 736 347
Source: Authors’ estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Note: (1) generalized residual is used in the ﬁrst model that estimates for
the whole sample and inverse mills ratio (IMR) is used in the second
equation for only to mobile owners. While the generalized residual is
meant to control endogeneity, IMR is to control for selection bias. (2)
Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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mobile phones for better market information.6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Translating technological opportunities into economic ben-
eﬁts has always been a development challenge in smallholder
agriculture. Sometimes, the adoption of a new technology
may not necessarily mean farmers are optimally using the
technology and maximizing the beneﬁt of the potential of
that technology. Mobile phone is a case in point. Many
farmers own mobile phones but to what extent this mobile
phone is helping farmers in making marketing decisions is
an important concern that many researchers and develop-
ment practitioners want to understand more. This paper
assessed the impact of mobile phone access both at house-
hold and village levels on marketing decisions and prices
received by farmers in Ethiopia. The results are mixed. How-
ever, in general, the impact is not strong enough to believe
that mobile phones are really helping farmers marketing
decisions. The empirical analyses on farm gate prices clearly
indicate that the impact is almost always insigniﬁcant. These
ﬁndings suggest that cell phones may be useful for certain
farmers in certain types of circumstances but in the study
area mobile phones do not seem to be an important channel
to access price information. The absence of mobile phones as
an eﬀective means of price discovery suggests that there
exists scope for alternative means of providing price infor-
mation.
Furthermore, the explanation for absence of mobile
phones as an eﬀective means of accessing price information
could be the limited use of mobile phones for searching agri-
cultural information. Only few of the farmers use mobile
phones to reduce information searching costs. This seems
to be due to lack of information sources that can deliver rel-
evant information to farmers. We, therefore, recommend
establishing information centers either at farmers’ coopera-
tive centers or at local agricultural development centers that
serve farmers as a reliable source of information and knowl-
edge.
The weak impact of mobile phone access on farmers’ bene-
ﬁts may also be attributed to the fact that eﬃciency created
due to mobile phones may be appropriated by traders more
than farmers. In this case, policy action is required to improve
the distribution of market improvement gains among farmers
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of sample households
Descriptive statistics Values
Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.6 (2.3)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 1.5 (0.9)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 1.7 (1.1)
Percentage of male headed 92.2
Mean (Std. Dev.) 43.7 (12.6)
rcentage who had basic education 65.0
rcentage who had basic education 43.9
Mean (Std. Dev.) 1.8 (2.0)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 0.73 (13.9)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 26.5 (45.4)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 4.3 (4.7)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 2.2 (4.9)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 7.2 (22.1)
Percentage 30.5
Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.2 (5.4)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 1.5 (1.5)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 7.1 (35.6)
rcentage with access to cooperative 75.0
Mean (Std. Dev.) 2.3 (5.0)
Percentage who are member 52.5
Percentage who use vehicle 5.2
Mean (Std. Dev.) 1.3 (2.1)
Percentage own electrical power 16.3
Table 13. Endogeneity tests of mobile ownership using control function approach
Coeﬃcient (Std.err) of generalized residual in each model
Price Selling to village market Selling to cooperative Frequency of transaction Size of transaction
Teﬀ 226.41 0.057 0.54 0.20 0.68**
(174.84) (0.42) (0 .43) (0.28) (0.31)
Wheat 19.43 0.35 0.82** 0.32 0.72***
(26.40) (0.29) (0.32) (0.21) (0.23)
Maize 38.63 0.64 2.27* 0.54 0.38
(56.49) (0.98) (1.14) (0.64) (0.42)
Barley 64.83 1.48** 2.2*** 0.33 0.93*
(82.45) (0.69) (0.74) (0.45) (0 .53)
Pulses NA 0.13 NA 0.08 1.28
(0 .77) (0 .66) (0.96)
Vegetables NA (0.46) NA 0.33 1.8**
(0.73) (0.63) (0.86)
Animal products NA 0.04 NA 0.73 NA
(0.66) (1.99)
Source: Authors estimation based on 2012 household survey data.
Notes: (1) NA = data not available. (2) The values are estimated in two-stage procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, mobile phone ownership is regressed against
several instruments and the generalized residual is estimated from this regression following Wooldridge (2007). Then the generalized residual is included in
the second-stage regression that estimates the dependent variables listed here for each commodity together with mobile ownership and other explanatory
variables.
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